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ETHICAL DILEMMAS CONFRONTING
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COUNSEL
Dorian D. Greene*
I. INTRODUCTION
The lawyer plays a crucial, yet ambivalent, role in the U.S. foreign
intelligence community. The lawyer is in an uncomfortable position, attempting
to bridge an enormous gap between two almost incompatible ethical (and legal)
frameworks: the due process, human rights-oriented constitutional structure of
U.S. domestic law, and the grey, harsh realities of power politics. Simultaneous-
ly the lawyer is both a servant for the community during the course of its rela-
tions with the remainder of the federal government and an oversight functionary
within the community itself. Daniel Silver, a one time General Counsel for both
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA),
emphasizes that the "first bastion of oversight" is and must be located within, not
outside, the intelligence agencies, with its focus on the Offices of General
Counsel.' Yet counsel must be flexible, sensitive, and creative so that the
advice does not hamstring the agency's fulfillment of its mission. Also, counsel
must be sufficiently empathetic for counsel's advice to be accepted within the
organization. Ignoring counsel's advice and thereby, circumventing the entire
Office of General Counsel, is eminently possible in such an organized, tightly
compartmentalized society. Fitting the attorney's constitutionally inspired legal
and ethical concerns into the procrustean bed of foreign intelligence operations
is a painful job and one which finds little sympathetic support within the intelli-
gence community as a whole. Richard Willard, Attorney General William
French Smith's Counsel for Intelligence Policy, upon assuming his duties, noted
"it was immediately apparent that there was enormous pent-up hostility in the
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intelligence community toward lawyers and legalistic restrictions."2  This
attitude "permeated the career service."93 This author can attest that ten years
later this general attitude has not shown any remarkable change.4
This paper explores some of the ethical dilemmas confronting intelligence
agency counsel. Its aim is to introduce an attorney with no prior knowledge 9f
intelligence work to some of the idiosyncrasies of the community, including its
chameleon ethical standards, unique recruitment characteristics, and ethical
variations from the norm which can be expected in the typical government
office. Special problem areas are highlighted. For example, the new attorney
has to struggle with questions concerning the identity of his "client" (agency,
President, or Congress). The Constitution and the courts provide little guidance.
Other problem areas include defining a "violation of a legal obligation to the
organization" or a "violation of law" (to use the language of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules)) in an ambivalent legal context,' as well as
issues associated with compartmentalization, sensitive intelligence collection,
covert action, and oversight. Finally, the new attorney must function in a unique
litigation environment due to severe constraints on discovery and disclosure.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: RECRUITMENT
In response to pressures generated by external (primarily congressional)
oversight, foreign intelligence agency offices of general counsel have grown
substantially in size since the mid-1970s and have increasingly recruited lawyers
from outside the agencies to fill positions up to and including General Counsel.
6
Apart from the oversight role sketched out above, lawyers are called upon to
support the agency before congressional investigations, to respond to the
increasing workload generated by executive orders and statutes, to provide a
focal point between the agency and executive oversight boards or the Attorney
General's Office, and to handle the dramatic increase in litigation involving
agencies.'
It is alleged that attorneys have relinquished lucrative private practices in
exchange for an opportunity to participate in intelligence law.' J. Edwin Dietel,
past Deputy General Counsel of the CIA and managing attorney in the agency's
sixty-lawyer office, lists five reasons which attract lawyers to intelligence work:
(1) responsibility for legal problems that have national or international
importance; (2) assumption of high levels of responsibility quickly; (3) a variety
of substantive legal challenges; (4) "a relaxed, yet dynamic work environment;
2. Richard K. Willard, Law and the National Security Decision-Making Process in the Reagan
Administration, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 129, 130 (1988).
3. Id.
4. The author is drawing upon six years of experience as a foreign intelligence analyst and manager.
5. See, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.13(b) (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
6. Daniel B. Silver et al., Oversight and Accountability of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies: An Evaluation
18 (1985) (report by the Working Group on Intelligence Oversight and Accountability of the Task Force on
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Law and National Security).
7. J. Edwin Dietel, Counseling Intelligence Operations, NAT'L L. REV., Sept. 25, 1989, at 18.
8. Id. at 19.
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And (5) [an] opportunity to apply creativity and innovation to real problems." 9
While Dietel's quick sketch is useful, it fails to penetrate the recruitment process
with any depth, leaving certain ethical issues for further illumination.
The first step in an examination into the ethical concerns of intelligence
counsel recruitment must begin with the big questions facing any attorney
contemplating work with the federal government. These include whether the
lawyer can maintain his duty of confidentiality, whether his employment with the
government presents conflicts of interest, what duty of competence he owes to
the government, and under what conditions he can accept, decline, or terminate
his representation. Other questions arise about his responsibilities as an advisor
distinct from his role as an advocate and how he is to confront "revolving door"
issues of post-government employment. Some of these issues will be dealt with
in depth at a later point. However at this juncture, it is only necessary to address
the prohibition such ethical concerns have on an applicant's recruitment. The
first step in this process is for the applicant to confront the restrictions
incorporated in the "ethics in government" laws.
U.S. government ethics laws are complex, including several U.S. Code
sections (particularly Title 18, Chapter 1 ),o the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 and its subsequent amendments," Executive Order No. 11,222 and its
amendments," and specific agency regulations. 3 Much of Title 18 which
deals with bribery, graft, and overt conflicts of interest, is not likely to weigh
heavily in an attorney's decision to join the intelligence agencies. The law
prohibiting attorneys from acting as an agent for, or accepting compensation
from, a foreign principal while employed by the federal government will likely
be anticipated, particularly as the new attorney is contemplating employment in
a sensitive, national security activity where any type of foreign allegiance is
unacceptable. 4  Many ethical concerns such as: the prohibition against
participation in decisions involving entities in which he or his immediate family
or associates have a financial interest, 5 limitations on post government employ-
ment involving representation of private interests before the government, 16 and
public disclosure and potential financial restructuring (for General Counsel and
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. app. 6 §§ 101-09 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-17 (1988).
11. 5 U.S.C. app. 6 §§ 101-09.
12. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306-11 (1965), reprinted as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
13. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 40 (1993).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1993). The restrictions contained within this law may be increased to a point where
it begins to act as a bar to some recruitment. President Clinton indicated that he would issue an executive
order which would significantly strengthen current federal government ethics requirements. Among the new
requirements would be a demand that 1,100 Presidential appointees sign a pledge not to act as lobbyists for
foreign governments or political parties at any time after leaving their government posts. It was intended that
General Counsels of agencies and departments would be affected by this restriction. See Lewis, Clinton Team
Unveils New Code of Ethics for Incoming Officials, SAN DiEGo UNION, Dec. 10, 1992, at A6. Obviously,
potential political appointees for intelligence agency General Counsel with current practices involving signifi-
cant foreign clients or domestic political parties, would be deterred from seeking such positions if this policy
is put into effect.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
16. Id. at § 207. The Clinton Administration indicated its intent to impose a five year ban on post-
government private representation before ex-agency employers. See Lewis, supra note 14, at A6.
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Deputy General Counsel positions) of all significant non-government income,
rents, honorariums, gifts, hospitality, or debts, 7 will not affect an attorney
seeking intelligence agency employment differently from those seeking
employment with the government in general. Similarly, Executive Order 11,222
(as amended), prohibiting the solicitation of financial favors" and the personal
use of federal property, 9 implores federal officials to meet all their "just"
financial obligations 0 and to avoid even the appearance of conflicts of
interest. 2' This would seem to weigh no heavier on intelligence agency counsel
than attorneys employed by other government agencies.22
For the attorney, de facto "ethics in government" restrictions are also
provided by the A.B.A.'s Model Rules and Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code). Many of the provisions in the Model Rules and
Model Code are aimed at practicing attorneys who fulfill public service roles or
are employed by regulatory bodies with public oversight functions.23 Here, the
attorney's relations with present or past clients are subject to certain restrictions.
Although an attorney employed by the intelligence agencies may be in a position
to obtain a special advantage for a past (or future) client, or have the power to
improperly influence a public official or agency,24 it is unlikely (due to security
considerations) that the attorney will know of many such agency-private sector
relationships prior to his employment.' One possible exception occurs when
the prospective recruit is corporate counsel for defense contractors with intelli-
gence agency service or hardware contracts.26
17. 5 U.S.C. app. 6 §§ 101-09.
18. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(a) (1983).
19. Id. §§ 735.204-205.
20. Id. § 735.207.
21. Id. § 735.204.
22. This is not to suggest that the intelligence community does not have some unique "ethics in
government" concerns which fall squarely within these categories, just that attorneys employed by the
community will less likely be troubled by these ethics concerns. Evidence suggests that many former CIA
officers with clandestine relationships overseas have personally gained from their ties after leaving the
government. These former officers engaged in a variety of personal business ventures, including the formation
of multinational partnerships, lobbying American businesses, consulting, and employment abroad with
American firms so as to be positioned to utilize their unique clandestine contacts. However, CIA officials insist
that agency guidelines for conflicts of interest are identical to those in the Ethics in Government Act which
impliedly prohibit the "revolving door" from rotating full circle. See Jeff Gerth, Former Intelligence Aides
Profiting from Old Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1981, at 1.
23. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4, 8-8 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
24. Id. at DR 8-101(A); see also MODEL RULES Rule 3.5(a).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 401 (1988). The Reagan
Administration White Paper on "United States Intelligence Activities" authorizes U.S. intelligence agencies to
enter into contracts with the private sector for "the provision of goods or services," but the agencies "need not
reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements."
26. This may not be an insignificant number of individuals however, as the intelligence community has
contracts with some of the biggest corporations in the U.S. (e.g., TRW, GM, GE, SAIC, Digital, etc.) For a
critical review of information sharing between the U.S. intelligence agencies and their corporate contractors,
see Robert Dreyfuss, Company Spies: The CIA has Opened a Global Pandora's Box by Spying on Foreign
Competitors of American Companies, MOTHER JONES, May 1994, at 16. This issue unites both ends of the
U.S. political spectrum. John Warner, Republican Senator from Virginia and Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, has criticized suggestions that the CIA conduct industrial espionage and
provide this information to U.S. corporations - thereby making the latter direct consumers of the foreign
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At this point in the analysis, one can move from general to more specific
ethical concerns in the recruitment process. Dietel indicates that interest in
national issues is a draw for service with the intelligence agencies. Moreover,
interest in national security issues or public service considerations are on the top
of any applicant's list of reasons for wanting to engage in foreign intelligence
work. It is the rare agency employee who does not articulate at least one or both
of these two interests as reasons for their choice of employment.27 Yet, since
Watergate and the subsequent highly publicized Church Committee2" hearings
on alleged excesses in the intelligence community, the articulation of such
interests often cuts along two very different ideological currents. One group
seeks to join the agencies in an effort to shield the latter against perceived
legislative zealotry, while a second group is just as motivated to protect the
American (and perhaps international) public from perceived agency excesses.
Unless provided with a political mandate from the White House, the agencies
tend to weed out most of the latter type from the selection pool during the
recruitment process. These "moral agents", who make it through the extensive
interviewing and clearance process, often find themselves in an uncomfortable
position once employed, and the implicit disapprobation of their colleagues
usually diminishes their morale. Often, these individuals (if still enamored with
intelligence work) will "defect" to Congress, and assume staff positions with the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, where institutionalized functions of legislative
oversight and partisan competition make for a more congenial work environment.
Although it is alleged that intelligence lawyering confronts a wide range of
substantive issues (and, in consequence, the Offices of General Counsel seek
"generalists" 29), practically speaking, security restrictions make it almost
impossible for a private person to learn about the nature of the office work.30
The difficulty of pre-education through internships or private research may thus
act as a bar to recruitment. On the other hand, the attorney applicant will know
exactly what pay grades are available and have a general appreciation for the
expected rate of promotion and overall salary caps. In most cases the pay rate
and promotion opportunities will be less than that which a young, aggressive
attorney can expect to earn in the private sector. Since the office duties are
unknown or "unknowable," pre-planned "revolving door" considerations may not
intelligence product. Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Federal News Service, Feb. 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Hearing of the Senate Select Committee].
The current Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, has asserted that the CIA will not engage in
industrial espionage. Hearing of the House Intelligence Committee, Federal News Service, Feb. 24, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Hearing of the House Intelligence Committee].
27. Other reasons may include a taste for adventure, a love of intrigue, or an attraction for those
individuals who enjoy being "on the inside" or "in the know."
28. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTVITIES AND
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON FOREIGN AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
29. Dietel, supra note 7, at 19.
30. This may be somewhat alleviated through an internship program, but these positions are strictly
limited and generally not sought after by more experienced attorneys.
1994]
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feature in the recruitment process.3' The combination of these factors will tend
to promote those applicants with strong national security or public service
interests while increasing the effect of lower pay (but financial predictability) on
the overall applicant pool. With no readily perceivable benefit of intelligence
agency service on subsequent private sector employment, the "careerist" will be
the usual, successful applicant.
The recruitment process can be abused when the applicant seeks admission
with no intent to work in the agency, but simply with the expectation of gaining
the security clearances. As the applicant must gamble on the agency, so must
the agency gamble on the applicant. "Semi-finalists" in the selection process
must pass an extensive special background investigation (SBI) before being em-
ployed and awarded their necessary clearance. For an agency attorney with
presumably broad access to Special Compartmentalized Intelligence (SCI) and
Special Activities Operations (SAO) or "covert" operations, an SBI is lengthy
and very expensive.32 At that point, the clearances themselves become a highly
marketable commodity and it is known that some applicants gain admission to
an intelligence agency only to quit soon after they have been "indoc'ed" into
their clearances. Usually, applicants use this information to improve their
employability with private (often defense) contractors who can hire the applicants
immediately, at reduced risk, and without significant expenditure on new SBI's.
Contractors are known to solicit applicants at this stage of the recruitment
process. The author is aware of several corporate counsel offices which have
benefitted from a rapid turnover in intelligency agency personnel, and although
it is impossible to distinguish premeditated applicant behavior from "second
thoughts" or other inducements to leave the service, "revolving door" clearance
peddling remains a hazard that the agencies have little choice but to accept.33
III. ETHics IN THE WORKPLACE
Once employed, counsel must confront ethics in the workplace. Ethical
considerations in intelligence management and decision-making are often-times
31. In an effort to determine whether there was a discernible pattern of employment in any given area of
law after attorneys left the intelligence agencies, the author conducted a survey of ex-employees in the
Martindaie-Hubble database. Approximately 200 attorneys were identified as having been employed as
intelligence agency or congressional intelligence committee counsel. A random survey of 20 of these attorneys
illustrated that their subsequent legal specialties did indeed encompass a broad spectrum of legal work,
including such diverse areas as contract, intellectual property, personal injury, tax, securities, labor, aviation
and health care law. A minor emphasis on administrative law or government relations was found throughout
the sample, but this was not deemed significant enough to invalidate the hypothesis that ex-intelligence
attorneys were indeed generalists and not attracted to intelligence work with preconceived "revolving door"
expectations.
32. The author is aware of SBI's which have consumed more than a year of investigative time and have
cost the government over $50,000 to complete.
33. The author has struggled with several ideas aimed at mitigating clearance peddling, but to no avail.
The most promising alternative involvs an employment contract which the applicant would sign just prior to
employment. However, this would probably be unacceptable to the agencies, as it limits their ability to
terminate employment, and national security demands that they maintain maximum flexibility in their personnel
management. Such contracts may also run afoul of current federal civil service employment laws. One
solution is for terminated employees to be detailed to innocuous activities for the remainder of their
employment contracts.
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a world apart from ethics concerns of other government offices. Two ethical
frameworks exist: "locational" ethics, the ethical environment in which counsel
works and "substantive" ethics, the ethical considerations upon which counsel
bases his advice and decisions. Counsel generally finds himself in the position
of having to accept the former, but possessing wide latitude to draw upon his
own resources for a definition of the latter.
A. Locational Ethics
The "locational ethics" of intelligence lawyering involves far more intrusive
scrutiny into the attorney's private life than for other government positions, and
certainly far more than what would ordinarily be considered acceptable in the
private sector. Beginning with the SBI, a complete financial record is compiled,
including as much of his financial history as is deemed necessary to determine
serious debt or bankruptcy. The SBI generally goes far beyond the simple
disclosure requirements incorporated in the provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act. 4 Spending habits are investigated to determine whether the
attorney spends beyond his means. Apart from demonstrating financial
responsibility, this investigation attempts to determine whether the attorney may
be a potential target for foreign intelligence activity (bribery and blackmail). A
lifestyle sketch is also compiled during the SBI. This sketch includes a summary
of activities, family, friends, organizations, narcotics or alcohol abuse (if any),
and sexual preferences. This is aimed at determining whether the attorney is
stable or whether he presents a significant target for subversion. At some point
near the end of the SBI, a polygraph examination is administered and the
attorney is asked to corroborate the truthfulness of his written application and
comment on any inconsistencies found during the course of the SBI.
35
The attorney may continue to be the target of intrusive scrutiny even after
beginning work with an intelligence agency. Indeed, if an agency believes it has
probable cause, such scrutiny may continue even after the attorney terminates his
employment with that agency. Executive Order No. 12,333 provides:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection
techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States
persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic
surveillance, physical searches without consent, mail surveillance, physical
surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures
34. 5 U.S.C. app. 6 §§ 101-09.
35. An excellent summary of the CIA's recruiting practices, including a candid assessment of the
drawbacks to a service career, and the high level of official scrutiny into one's private affairs, can be found
in David Wise, Campus Recruiting and the CIA, N.Y. TimES, June 8, 1986, at 20. Senior policy makers
continually wrestle with the question of to what extent intelligence agency employees should be subjected to
intrusive scrutiny. William Cohen, Republican Senator from Maine and former Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, recently summed up the dilemma:
[Hlow do you preserve the civil liberties of people who work in our government. We don't want
to Stalinize our intelligence community as such by hooking people up to lie detector tests or
urinalysis and . .. maybe even truth serums .... By the same token, we want to make sure that
those people who are granted access to our ... most treasured national secrets really give up
something, they give up some of their rights of privacy.
Charlie Rose (WNET Educational Broadcasting Company broadcast, Mar. 17, 1994).
19941
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established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney
General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and
limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures
shall not authorize ... [p]hysical surveillance of a United States person in the
United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for ... [pihysical surveillance
of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors
or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or
contracting.
36
In addition to a certain amount of intrusiveness, the attorney must accept
strict controls over speech, publishing and possibly association. Employees of
the intelligence agencies enter into secrecy agreements with their employers to
protect the confidentiality of materials with which these employees are entrusted.
These agreements are binding even after the employee has severed his relation-
ship with the government.
Breach of confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship is proscribed by
law. Severe criminal sanctions attach to the unauthorized public disclosure of
sensitive national security information." The law is broadly supported by the
Model Code and Model Rules which both weigh against unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information." Indeed, the net cast by the Model Rules sweeps
widely, requiring government attorneys to maintain client confidentiality even
while disagreeing "with the policy goals that their representation is designed to
advance.39  Similar restrictions on publishing also apply. The attorney is
required to submit any work even remotely related to his job for review. This
procedure may involve the oversight of a variety of offices or agencies and may
take months to approve the final draft. Review of publications may be
demanded even after the attorney has left the agency.' Lack of compliance by
the attorney may result in agency-initiated litigation that will most likely result
in an injunction against publication and possibly both criminal and civil
penalties. Controls over freedom of association are not as overt, but may be just
as pervasive. For example, the attorney may be forced to drastically curtail
certain foreign and domestic contacts or social relations.4'
36. Executive Order No. 12,333, supra note 25, § 2.4 (emphasis added).
37. For example, criminal penalties for unauthorized release of signals intelligence (SIGINT) is authorized
in 18 U.S.C. § 798(a). On the other hand, highly placed officials disclosing classified information may be
shielded from criminal prosecution by Congressional or Executive immunity. During 1987, for example, Dave
Durenberger, Republican Senator from Minnesota, immediate past Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, and once Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, revealed to campaign supporters
that the U.S. intelligence community had recruited "an Israeli to spy on Israel." Durenberger, himself a lawyer,
was merely "admonished" by the Senate Ethics Committee. David Durenberger's 'Oversights', WASH. TIMES,
June 14, 1990 at F2; STAR TRIB., Apr. 4, 1993 at IA, Sept. 17, 1993 at 14A.
38. MODEL CODE Canon 4; MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
39. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 6.
40. Arthur S. Hulnick & Daniel W. Mattausch, Ethics and Morality in United States'Secret Intelligence,
12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 521 n.39 (1989).
41. Following the 1994 indictment and conviction for espionage of veteran CIA operative Aldrich Ames,
six bills were introduced in Congress which would give the Executive enhanced authority to investigate the
private affairs of prospective and current intelligence personnel. Three of the bills, S. 1886, S. 1869, and H.R.
No. 4137, mandate that candidates for top secret security clearances consent to investigative access of their
financial records, consumer credit reports, and records of foreign travel. Once employed, new hires would be
required to report contacts with foreign nationals and all private foreign travel. Reporting would continue, in
[Vol. 2:91
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Another problem in the workplace relates to information. As access to
information is the heart and soul of the legal profession, the particular problems
involving the lawyer's access to information in the intelligence services need to
be addressed. The bedrock security institution of the intelligence services is the
compartmentalization of information. Compartmentalization has been likened to
the use of watertight compartments aboard a ship; if one of these is breached,
only those individuals in that compartment are lost. Similarly, if an information
compartment is breached, only those immediately concerned are effected.
Compartmentalization thus protects the system by keeping any one person from
knowing too much, thus minimizing potential loss if that individual should
commit an unauthorized disclosure. In the argot of the intelligence community,
one must have a "need to know" directly related to job activities before acquiring
a specific clearance. Even more explicit, compartmentalization protects the
source of intelligence information, restricting the number of individuals who, by
virtue of their knowledge, could compromise the source's integrity.
Compartmentalization obviously makes it very difficult to discern the "big
picture," an all important factor in making sound legal and ethical decisions. In
all U.S. intelligence organizations, access to compartmentalized information
increases with advances up the hierarchical pyramid. For instance, a superior
usually has access to all of his subordinate's compartments. However, this is not
true in every case. In a tightly controlled operation, access may be severely
limited to a few people, not all of whom are in a clear chain of command.
Indeed, these people may not even know one another, but an overview of the
entire operation is maintained by one or two people at the top.
42
Access may also be divided functionally into informational, operational, and
administrative channels. Thus, access to a type of activity may be classified and
restricted by end product ("finished" intelligence), means of collection, or
dissemination channels. For example, consider a satellite collection system. The
scientists who designed the system may have one clearance, the engineers and
technicians who operate the system and see the raw data, another clearance, the
managers who task the system, a third clearance (or set of clearances), and the
analysts who place requests for data, a fourth clearance. The same is true for
intelligence collected from people. The operative who handles the "source" of
the information is generally unwilling to provide more than the necessary
some cases, for up to five years after termination of employment. Two other bills, S. 1948 and S. 1890, would
force employees to open their tax returns, bank and investment accounts, and other assets to investigative
scrutiny, or to submit financial disclosure statements under the Ethics in Government Act. The bill introduced
by the Clinton Administration, "The Counterintelligence and Security Enhancement Act of 1994," incorporates
many of these measures into a framework relying upon agency discretion rather than legislative fiat. Senate
Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Counterintelligence Efforts, Federal News Service, May 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File.
42. Senator Frank Church once remarked "how elusive the chain of command can be in the intelligence
community," stating that this institutionalized ambiguity "underscores dramatically the necessity for tighter
internal controls." L. JOHNSON, SEASON OF INQUIRY: CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE 76 (1985). Senator
Howard Baker, commenting on allegations of domestic intelligence operations conducted by the CIA, implored
Congress not to be so concerned that "the CIA.. .was engaged in domestic intelligence, but whether someone
was running the show. I know that Congress was not running the show; and I want to be relieved of that
shuddering fear I have that the White House was not, either." Id. at 10.
1994]
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administrative details of his operation to anyone other than his superior (indeed,
this is often a condition imposed by the source). Eliciting information from the
source may be the result of money payments or may be generated out of
ideological motives, but the operative may also be applying some illegal or
unethical pressure on the source. Information of this nature is rarely widely
disseminated. The operative relates the source's information to a "reports
officer" who acts as a conduit, transferring substantive information from the
operative to the analyst, and vice versa, the analyst's requirements back to the
operative. The final information may be distributed in "tailored" packets
designed for a variety of consumers, each packet varying in degree of detail.
Reference to the information's mode of origin may ultimately be entirely
eliminated, thus the consumer does not know how the information was collected,
processed, or analyzed.
Compartmentalization obviously places forbidding restrictions on an
attorney's access to information. Therefore, it is very difficult for an attorney
to assess single activity in the context of the "big picture." Such an assessment
is an important step in determining whether the activity under legal scrutiny
represents, to use the language of the Model Rules, a "violation of law" or a
"violation of a legal obligation to the organization."" On the other hand,
attorneys are required "to the extent permitted by law" to report any "intelligence
activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to
Executive order or Presidential directive" to the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board (PIOB). The PIOB reports directly to the President.45
Counsel is also required to keep the PIOB current with respect to more routine
activities by means of quarterly reports.6 The PIOB is critically dependent
upon General Counsel's initiative. The part-time Board meets one day every
other month, is supported only by one lawyer and one secretary, and lacks
subpoena power.47 Therefore, it has neither the time nor the resources to
effectively investigate suspect agency activities without a clear Presidential direc-
tive. Counsel's role is, thus, clearly not just based on advice or liaison, but also
devoted to oversight. The system, however, is constructed to strenuously resist
full disclosure to counsel. Dietel obliquely suggests that counsel will have to pry
information out of the system: "[a] maturity for dealing with seasoned
operational officers as clients ...- is critical to a successful practice in this
43. MODEL RULES Rule 3.12.
44. Exec. Order No. 12,334 § 4, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401.
45. Id. § 3. Note however, during the Reagan Administration, reporting "directly" to the President meant
in practice, reporting through the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, who generally acted as
a filter or conduit. See Bretton G. Sciaroni, The Theory and Practice of Executive Branch Intelligence
Oversight, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 414 n.67, 430 (1989).
46. This process originated during the Ford Administration, as set forth in Exec. Order No. 11,905
§ 6(b)2, 3 C.F.R; 102 reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §401 (1976). This process was discontinued during the Carter
Administration, but resumed during the Reagan-Bush years. Sciaroni, supra note 45, at 414.
47. Observations by Senators Rudman and Trible during the Iran-Contra hearings. See 5 IRAN-CONtRA
INVESTIGATION: JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION & HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS
TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 431,442 (1988) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION].
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field. 48 Counsel's access to information may depend as much upon establish-
ing personal relationships based upon mutual trust, as it does upon legal
requirements for full disclosure. Once this mutual trust breaks down, counsel
may find his access restricted to generic information only, devoid of telling
detail.
Further compounding the problem of access, counsel may not have the
benefit of advice from others in his immediate office,49 a situation generally
unanticipated for most types of legal practices.50 The dictates of compartmen-
talization may restrict program oversight to a single attorney and General
Counsel or Deputy General Counsel. Both of the latter are designated "senior
employees," at least by the CIA,5 and thus may be political appointees. This
situation could potentially be difficult for counsel, particularly if he is
uncomfortable with the legal uncertainties associated with a decision, but is
feeling some political pressure to "rubber stamp" the process.52
B. Substantive Ethics
Difficulties associated with "substantive ethics" will be even more poignant
than with "locational ethics," because it is upon the bedrock of "substantive
ethics" that counsel will base advice and decisions. Dietel indicates that "the
most important qualification for an intelligence lawyer is the ability to step back
48. Dietel, supra note 7, at 19.
49. Id.
50. The Model Rules, for example, indicate that "[l]awyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's
practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that
particular information be confined to specified lawyers." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 8. Similarly, the Model
Code provides that "[ulnless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may disclose the affairs of his client to
partners or associates of his firm." MODEL CODE EC 4-2. However, language of EC 4-2 does anticipate that
counsel may be highly restricted from seeking advice from colleagues:
[t]hus, in the absence of consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate
another lawyer in the handling of a matter; nor should he, in the absence of consent, seek counsel
from another lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility that the identity of the client or his
confidences or secrets would be revealed to such lawyer.
MODEL CODE EC 4-2.
51. 5 C.F.R. § 737.33; FED. ETHICS HANDBOOK (Michie Supp. 1984).
52. One possible way of ameliorating this type of political pressure would be to require that Presidential
appointees for the Offices of General Counsel be confirmed by the Senate before assuming their duties. This
was a proposal suggested by the Iran-Contra Investigative Committee's Majority Report. See SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSmON & HOUSE SELECT
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT'EES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, wrrH SUPPLEMENTAL, MINORITY, AND ADDITIONAL
VIEWS, S. Rep. No. 216 & H. R. Rep. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 425 (1987). The end result of this
would be to politicize the positions of General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel in yet another fashion
(increasing the tension between the Office of General Counsel and the remainder of the agency). Benefits, on
the other hand, would be more insurance that General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel's substantive
ethical world views were acceptable to the majority party in the Senate, a useful brick in building an Executive-
Legislative consensus on intelligence operations. In May 1991, Senator John Glenn attempted to tack a bill
onto the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 which would require that agency General Counsel and Deputy
General Counsel be confirmed by the Senate, however, the bill was voted down on the floor. See Marcus
Raskin, Let's Terminate the CIA, NATION, June 8, 1992, at 776. The Clinton Administration also disfavors this
approach. Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, supra note 26.
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and ask: Is the proposed result fair? Is it just? Is it right? ' 53 Counsel will be
asked to judge the appropriateness of sensitive intelligence collection or coveit
operations with relation to the rough and tumble world of international politics,
without the comforting insulation of the Model Rules, the Model Code, or even
constitutional considerations of due process and fundamental human rights. At
the same time, counsel must remain aware of the social tenor of the times
(particularly as represented by the press) and partisan considerations (both within
Congress and between Congress and the Executive). The latter factor is
particularly relevant in view of eventual legislative oversight of, and reaction to,
intelligence programs.
In this context, one might ask: "What are the ethical standards of American.
intelligence operations?" No clear answer emerges. The author believes that the
agencies work within a dual, or even a three-tiered moral framework: operations
directed against U.S. citizens, at home or abroad, are conducted within the
framework of U.S. law and expected propriety; operations conducted against
foreigners, most explicitly abroad, are generally expected not to breach some
basement standard of "American values and fair play;" and, possibly, a nebulous
category of "no holds barred" activities may be permissible if required to protect
critical U.S. interests from an overarching and imminent threat.
The Working Group on Intelligence Oversight and Accountability of the
A.B.A.'s Standing Committee on Law and National Security circulated a
questionnaire to intelligence agency managers, asking for their estimate of,
among other things, the ethical standards of American foreign intelligence
operations. It is interesting to note that twenty-five percent of the respondents
of this survey were intelligence agency counsel and approximately fifty percent
were lawyers.5' The group received a wide variety ofopinions ranging from
"substantive" to "procedural." The responding opinions included the following
ideas: moral standards must be based upon American values and measured by
what is appropriate in "targeting" U.S. citizens; certain forms of necessary
intelligence activity may involve deception, extortion, bribery, theft, untoward
intrusions into personal privacy, and violence, none of which can be squared
with morality, to avoid hypocrisy, a "just war" analysis is imperative; flexibility
at all costs; even assassination may be required (e.g. in the event of an imminent
terrorist attack on the President or a nuclear attack), but there is no need for
torture; a dual standard is required; one for U.S. citizens and a second for
foreigners; permanent standards are unwise, instead the standards should vary
within a historical context, and individual agencies should establish their own
standards of conduct, with ad hoc commissions established after-the-fact to
illuminate/correct the worst abuses; the oversight process is akin to the Anglo-
American case law system, where Executive oversight agencies and Congress
provide boundaries of the acceptable; standards of behavior should be established
in charter documents and given life through "good will" exchanges between
53. Dietel, supra note 7, at 19.
54. Silver, supra note 6, at 113-14.
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Congress and the Executive; procedures adopted for approving covert activities
develop standards, but categorical lists of "do's and don'ts" do not.55
Thus, the basic question becomes what the lawyer expects his substantive
ethical role in the U.S. foreign intelligence community to be: moral agent, ethical
safety net, neutral advisor, or public advocate? The answer to this question is
complex and depends upon a variety of circumstances: the substantive ethics of
the attorney, the foreign policy ethics of both the administration and the working
ranks of the intelligence community, the amount of bipartisan consensus or
partisan discord between the Executive and Congress, the general ethical
concerns of the public, and the adversarial position of the press. Since space
constraints are a consideration, we will use this context to examine only the first
and the last of the four substantive ethical roles outlined above. The roles of
"moral agent" and "public advocate" are chosen because they represent the range
of choice within which counsel will be forced to operate.
1. Counsel as Moral Agent
This emphasis is most likely to occur after a change in administrations when
the incoming administration attempts to redirect the broad direction of U.S.
foreign intelligence activities as inherited from its predecessors. Here, the lawyer
as a "moral agent" is generally used to "rein in" the intelligence community.
The Clinton Administration appears to conform to this pattern of behavior.
56
The Carter Administration however, provides the best recent example of
executive use of counsel in this role.
President Carter assumed office in the wake of the Church Committee
hearings on foreign and domestic intelligence agency abuses. The community
was alleged to have been involved in assassination plots against a variety of
foreign figures, the destabilization of governments and foreign currencies, secret
wars, coups, and covert arms transfers. Also, the community had been targeted
with accusations of covert administration of experimental drugs to unsuspecting
people both at home and abroad, and the intrusive surveillance upon and
manipulation of U.S. dissident groups. Carter indicated that he was deeply
troubled by intelligence community involvement in these types of activities and
stated that during his administration, "moral principles" would guide the exertion
of American power and influence abroad.57 Carter's Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), Admiral Stansfield Turner, echoed his boss' approach to
intelligence activities: "There is one overall test of the ethics of human
55. Id. at 40-44.
56. In the wake of the Ames scandal, Director Woolsey has vowed to institute oversight procedures
holding operations personnel to higher standards of ethics and accountability. Tim Weiner, Agency Chief
Pledges to Overhaul 'Fraternity' Atmosphere at C.IA., N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1994, at Al. Gender discrimina-
tion within the agency has also been targeted by the Clinton Administration, with Woolsey pledging to change
those CIA personnel practices currently favoring an "all-male fraternity." All Things Considered (NPR radio
broadcast, Sept. 21, 1994). Woolsey has had significant experience in the adversarial legal oversight of
intelligence activities. As general counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the early 1970s,
he did much of the staff work supporting the Committee's investigation of the CIA's role in Watergate.
Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, supra note 26.
57. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 143 (1982).
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intelligence activities. That is whether those approving them felt that they could
defend their decisions before the public if the actions became public.""8
Faithful to their word, at least one quarter of the Carter Administration's major
policy paper on foreign intelligence dealt with detailed prohibitions on covert
activities, including a ban on assassination, severe restrictions on all manner of
surveillance against U.S. citizens, and restrictions on the use of third party
contractors. 59  Even prior to the publication of Carter's policy, Turner, had
begun cutting Directorate of Operations (DO) personnel at Langley, and within
the next month, it was announced that twenty percent of the DO staff had
received pink slips.' During the following year, a substantial portion of the
remaining mid-to-senior level covert staff resigned or took early retirement.6'
By 1979, Turner, commenting on the small number of covert operations left
functioning in the U.S. intelligence services, stated flatly that there were so few,
"not because we are not allowed to do them, but because we can't find the
applicability of covert action to our country's needs. 62
Turner was not alone in his efforts to minimize covert activities. Vice
President Walter Mondale worked diligently throughout Carter's tenure, in a
coordinated effort with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to produce
an intelligence community "charter" which would set clear limits on U.S. foreignintelligence activity.' Various drafts of these charters barred the agencies from
specific activities such as: assassination, overthrowing democratic governments,
employing torture, planting agents in domestic news gathering or religious
organizations, using infiltrators to provoke political organizations into committing
illegal acts, influencing the policies of corporations, committing intrusive acts of
surveillance on U.S. citizens abroad without a court order, creating shortages of
food and water, starting epidemics or floods, assisting foreign security forces in
human rights violations, etc.' Each of these restrictions were to be policed
primarily by agency counsel. The charter effort ultimately died, a victim of a
more conservative mood swing in Congress.65 However, the legal requirements
during the Carter Administration restricting covert activities, including a statutory
requirement to notify up to eight congressional committees, virtually eliminated
secret American foreign intervention. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
caustically commented that by this time, the CIA had become limited to "doing
research that might as well be done in the Library of Congress." 66
58. STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY (1985) reprinted in part in NEWSWEEK, May 20,
1985, at 81.
59. Exec. Order No. 12,036 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 125-40 (1978).
60. American Survey, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1977, at 28; Controversy Over "Czar"for Intelligence, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 1978, at 50.
61. FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEwS DIGEST, Feb. 23, 1979, at 132, col. G3.
62. Is the CIA Hobbled?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1979, at 44.
63. George Lardner, Jr., Intelligence Charter: Time May Run Out as Spies Argue, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
1979, at AI0; Bernard D. Nossiter, Effort to Curb Spy Agencies Turns into a Permission List, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 1979, at A2.
64. Id.
65. Anne Karalekas, Intelligence Oversight: Has Anything Changed?, 6 WASH. Q., Summer 1983, at 22.
66. Should the CIA's Black Arts Go Back into Darkness?, ECONOMIST, May 12, 1979, at 43.
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Throughout this "reining in" process, lawyers played a critical role. Turner
wrote, "[i]t's almost mandatory today that the agency's lawyers be consulted
before sensitive operations are undertaken and often as they progress ....
Lawyers have become part of the operations team."67  Daniel Silver, CIA
General Counsel between 1979 and 1981, believed that it was:
[E]ssential that the general counsel and lawyers on that person's staff be
independent, strong-minded and conceive of the office in a broader role than merely
serving as the personal legal counsel to the agency head ... [I]t is important that the
agency head and agency management respect the law and recognize that the General
Counsel's Office should be involved in the planning stages of [all] significant
operations; in decisions relating to the interpretations of any legal requirements ...
and generally in all decisions raising issues of sensitivity ... whether or not a direct
question of legal interpretation can be discerned."
Lawyers, both within the Carter Administration and of the staff for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, played an active role in the unsuccess-
ful attempt to force the intelligence community to accept charter documents that
would explicitly prohibit a variety of collection and covert activities. Thus, the
intelligence lawyer's role during the Carter years was, most explicitly, that of a
"moral agent," whose goal was to bring the intelligence community into legal
and ethical parity with the American public. However, the price of moral agency
and the zeal to achieve community consistency with domestic ethical and legal
standards, may be the virtual elimination of covert U.S. foreign activities, thereby
depriving the President of a whole spectrum of tools for American foreign
policy.
2. Counsel as Public Advocate
In contrast to the Carter Administration's approach, during the Reagan
Administration intelligence agency counsel acted as public advocates for
community activities. They did so primarily by providing the Executive with
constitutional and legal justifications to use before potentially hostile congressio-
nal committees. Particularly during the first term of the Reagan Presidency,
counsel assumed an activist public relations role, justifying increased collection
efforts and covert operations not by reference to American domestic morality,
but to the global superpower competition. Realpolitik concerns became
paramount, and means, short of war, were again judged as necessary tools in the
expanding ideological and political competition. The Republican platform was
clear on this point: "[we] will undertake an urgent effort to rebuild the intelli-
gence agencies, and to give full support to their knowledgeable staffs ... we will
seek the repeal of ill-considered restrictions sponsored by Democrats, which have
debilitated U.S. intelligence capabilities while easing the intelligence collection
and subversion efforts of our adversaries."'69 William J. Casey, both as a
lawyer and as Reagan's first Director of Central Intelligence, saw a large part of
67. Kirk Victor, CIA Counsel's Role Questioned, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 3 (quoting STANSFIELD
TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY (1985)).
68. Silver, supra note 1, at 14-15.
69. 126 CONG. REC. 20,633 (1980) (Republican Platform).
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his duties as public relations specialist, as selling enhanced community
responsibilities to Congress, the press, and the public.
One of Casey's first directives as DCI was to pack-up the CIA's Office of
General Counsel and send it as far from the headquarters building as possible.7'
The symbolism of this act was not lost on agency personnel; counsel was to have
a minimal role in the day-to-day operations of the community. On Casey's
initiative, Silver, still CIA General Counsel, produced a major revision of
Carter's foreign intelligence policy planning document. Silver substantially
downgraded executive agency oversight requirements, relaxed restrictions on
agency infiltration of domestic organizations, reduced warrant requirements for
searches and surreptitious entries, and dropped the "probable cause" standard for
initiating many covert activities. He also once again distanced the President
from covert operations by reintroducing the concept of plausible deniability."
Silver was soon replaced by William P. Barr, an activist conservative who
quickly developed a reputation as willing to go to the mat with congressional
intelligence committees.72 Barr's successor, Stanley Sporkin, was accused by
the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee of justifying retroactively
authorized covert activity on questionable legal grounds, and of stretching the
legal interpretation of what constitutes "timely" notification of Congress beyond
acceptable limits. 3  Other executive agency intelligence oversight positions,
such as General Counsel for the PIOB, were staffed by legal "unknowns" with
strong conservative credentials and minimal foreign policy background. They
were given none of the tools or time which would allow them to conduct effec-
tive oversight, and they were pressured to justify administration policy rather
than confront it.74
The role of public advocate can often be uneasy. Judge William H.
Webster, DCI during the latter Reagan years and for most of the Bush
Administration, was specifically selected to succeed the flamboyant Casey due
to his impeccable legal credentials and reputation for judicial caution. Yet, in
the wake of a failed coup attempt against Panama's Manuel Noriega, Webster
was the administration's front man in advocating a repeal on the prohibition
against foreign assassinations. It is most likely that intra-administration politics
compelled Webster to take this position. Given Webster's low-key style, his
efforts to reestablish ties with hostile, partisan congressional intelligence commit-
70. Silver, supra note 6. at 104.
71. Robert Pear, Intelligence Groups Seek Power to Gain Data on U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1981, at A1, B9.
72. Michael Isikoff, No. 2 Aide at Justice Quits Post; Ayer Reportedly 'Frozen Out' at Top, WASH. POST,
May 12, 1990, at AI.
73. Tu ,NER supra note 58, at 3. Monroe Freedman, Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics at Hofstra
University Law School, suggests that Sporkin may have failed to investigate the Iran-Contra covert operation
with a standard of "due diligence" calculated to have assured Sporkin that these activities were "not designed
to frustrate the public interest." Monroe Freedman, Sporkin's Question Backfires, TEX. LAW., Jan. 25, 1993,
at 15.
74. Kenneth Jost, Reagan's 'Inquire No Evil' Legal Team, LEGAL T1A!s, June 22, 1987, at 16.
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tees in the wake of the Iran-Contra hearings, and his innate conservativism, it is
highly unlikely that he would voluntarily reopen this highly charged issue.75
Even murkier are those questions dealing with perjury before congressional
committees," investigative commissions,77 executive oversight bodies,78 and
court proceedings in support of (or shielding) illegal or sensitive covert
operations. It can be surmised that there are numerous reasons for perjury of this
type, including protecting the agency or personnel of the agency from
embarrassment or litigation, protecting sources or operatives from potentially
lethal exposure, and shielding expensive operations and assets from compromise.
Perjury is also possible when the witness believes it necessary to protect political
figures in the administration, such as the President, from direct association with
exposed covert activities. Counsel could easily find himself in a very difficult
ethical position where actively supporting a client's perjury would not only
shield his client, the agency, and even the President, but might be instrumental
in protecting the lives of covert operatives. On the other hand, counsel could be
transgressing key ethical requirements of his profession, as well as actively
committing contempt of Congress (or other duly constituted oversight bodies).
Withdrawal may not be an option in this case because alternative counsel may
not be readily available, and the stakes of failure are high. As of this moment,
agency counsel has not been directly implicated in perjury. However, to what
extent they may have knowingly assisted clients, with full knowledge of the
client's intent to commit perjury, is unclear.
Public advocacy also extends into court, where it may, on occasion, border
on overzealous representation. CIA and NSA counsel are frequently called upon
to defend suits filed under the Freedom of Information Act and occasionally, the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Often discovery is blunted by the National Security
Act of 1947,"9 which provides blanket protection for intelligence "sources and
methods," and blocks discovery requests for classified information. Judges must
review the CIA documents in camera under the Classified Information
Procedures Act of 198080 and have proved most reticent to order the release of
classified information. Plaintiff's lawyers suspect the agencies of hiding
embarrassing or incriminating information under the cover of the National
Security Act as well as legitimately secret information. Indeed, such information
75. David B. Ottaway, Coming Out of the Cold; Webster Publicly Seeks Leeway for the CIA, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 1989, at Al; Thomas Powers, The Perils of Covert Policy: Snares and Seductions, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1989, at MI.
76. In the most recent example, the Deputy Director of the CIA for Operations, Clair George, was
convicted on Dec. 9, 1992, of two counts of lying under oath to the House Intelligence Committee on Oct. 5,
1986, and then to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Dec. 3, 1986. The lies concerned agency involvement
with the covert resupply of Nicaraguan rebels. SAN DIEGO UNoN-TRiB., Dec. 10, 1992, at A25.
77. Joseph F. Fernandez, CIA Chief of Station in Costa Rica between 1984 and 1986, was indicted for
lying to the Tower Commission, charged with investigating U.S. government involvement in Iran-Contra
activities. Fernandez successfully invoked the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1
(1982), to produce a ruling that classified information needed to convict him was inadmissible and thus the
indictments against him dismissed. United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990).
78. Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 150.
79. 50 U.S.C. § 401.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 6(e) (1982).
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can be either of the above."' Agency counsel are also suspected of effectively
using the lengthy review procedures incorporated in the Act to provide a ready-
made statute of limitations defense, as well as exhausting plaintiff's time and
financial resources.8 2 If either of these charges are valid, agency counsel may
be skirting perilously close to the ethical line provided in the Model Code. As
a government lawyer, "he should not use his position or the economic power of
the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or
results."83 Similarly, he "should not suppress evidence that he or his client has
a legal obligation to reveal or produce."'
IV. CONCLUSION
An attorney seeking entry into the intelligence community as agency
counsel must be prepared to confront a variety of ethical dilemmas. Some of
these concerns are widely known, such as the financial disclosure requirements,
conflict of interest regulations, and representational restrictions enforced by
general government ethics laws. Obstacles to recruitment peculiar to the
intelligence community, such as the lack of general knowledge concerning
counsel's duties and the continuing scrutiny of counsel's personal life, makes the
choice of such a career even more difficult. Finally, the unique demands of
intelligence work place counsel under severe restrictions in accessing informa-
tion, restrictions which may prove to be insurmountable obstacles to performing
competently unless counsel is endowed with exceptional interpersonal skills.
Litigation and counsel's position of strength, supported by various national
secrecy laws, place demands on ethics due to the ever present possibility such
legal shields may entice him to commit overzealous representation. Complicat-
ing the entire picture are external circumstances such as the philosophy toward
foreign intelligence operations, as established by the White House and Congress.
Such circumstances exert enormous pressure on counsel to conform to a given
set of ethical norms. Yet, counsel will have great latitude to conduct oversight
and advisory responsibilities within a personal, substantive, and ethical
framework. If such views clash with those held by counsel's superiors, the
working environment may not be pleasant, but there is still the opportunity to
affect the conduct of daily intelligence operations.
81. Marianne Lavelle, They Keep the CIA's Secrets Secret, NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1988, at 1.
82. Id. See also, Neil A. Lewis, Iran-Contra Judge Proves to be a Master of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1992, at A21.
83. MODEL CODE EC 7-14.
84. ld. at EC 7-27.
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